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1.  Introduction 
 Since the IT bubble burst in 2000, interest rates have fallen and housing prices 
have risen in the global economy.  According to Case and Shiller(2003), for example, the 
ratio of house prices to per capita income soared from around 6.5 in 2000 to around 8.5 in 
2003 in California.  Along with the soaring house prices, investment on house construction 
also increased at a substantial pace.  For example, the residential investment in the U.S. 
increased by 4.9% in 2002 and 7.5% in 2003, while GDP grew at the rate of 2.2% in 2002 
and 3.1% in 2003. 
 Korea was no exception in this global trend.  During the period from 2001 to 
2003, the general house price index rose by more than 30%.  However, the prices of 
apartments --- the most preferred housing type in recent years --- rose by more than 50% 
nationwide, and by almost 100% in the Kangnam area (south of Han River) of Seoul.  
Along with the rise in house prices, construction industries enjoyed a boom.  The average 
annual growth rate of building construction investment during the period of 2001-2003 
reached at 13.3%, while the average GDP growth rate remained only at 4.6%.  This boom 
increased the portion of building construction relative to GDP from 8.4% in 2000 to 11.3% 
in 2003. 
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 In addition to all of these standard indicators, however, the Korean housing market 
has a unique chonsei system that provides a very meaningful indicator for the market value 
of housing service --- chonsei price, or an up-front lump-sum deposit from the tenant to the 
owner for the use of the property with no additional requirement for periodic rent payments 
(see Section 2 for details).  While chonsei prices, as well as sales prices, should reflect 
demand and supply in the housing market, the two prices have shown sharply different 
trends since the second half of 2002 (see [Figure 1]).  Until the first half of 2002, both 
prices had rapidly recovered from the collapse after the 1997 crisis.  Since then, however, 
only the sales prices have kept rising while the chonsei prices have stagnated, which has 
sharply raised the ratio of sales to chonsei price or lowered the real value of chonsei deposit 
(deflated by the sales price).  This phenomenon can, in a sense, be interpreted as a transfer 
of wealth from chonsei tenants to house owners. 
 Motivated by this observation, this paper examines the determinants of the relative 
housing prices --- sales and chonsei prices --- and shows that the relative housing prices 
depend on the ratio of nominal to real interest rate.  It is probably easy to expect that the 
discrepancy between the two housing prices is widened as the (expected) inflation rate 
increases.  At the same time, however, the discrepancy can also be widened when the real 
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interest rate declines, even though the monetary authority adamantly sticks to a pre-
announced inflation target.  In fact, this argument applies not only to the housing prices, 
but also to the prices of general nominal assets that are not hedged against inflation. 
If the monetary authority has concerns over the potential wealth transfers due to 
the decline in real interest rate, it could, at least in theory, maintain the relative housing 
prices (or relative prices of real to nominal assets) by proportionately adjusting the target 
level of inflation rate to the decline of the real interest rate.1  This result may find its 
relevancy to an economy like Korea, in which real interest rates are secularly declining and 
the credit market is not yet completely accessible to households (see Sections 2 and 5). 
 This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 explains the chonsei system of 
Korea and Section 3 contains a theoretical model that explains the determination of housing 
prices.  The first part of Section 3 discusses the arbitrage condition between the sales and 
chonsei prices, and the second part presents a simple general-equilibrium growth model 
                                              
1
 The recent volatility in asset prices under the stable and low inflation environment has triggered a 
challenge on the standard inflation targeting framework.  While a majority of economists (e.g. 
Bernanke and Gertler (2001), and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002)) still support the standard monetary 
policy framework represented by Taylor rules, a group of economists (e.g. Cecchetti et. al.(2000), 
Borio and Lowe (2002), and Hahm and Hong (2003)) argue that the monetary authority needs to 
react to asset price bubbles in order to stabilize the economy.  See Bean (2003) for this debate.  
Although from a quite different perspective, this paper’s result could be interpreted to provide a 
rationale for the monetary policy that considers asset price fluctuations. 
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that includes housing sector.  Section 4 presents the results of a crude empirical analysis on 
the ratio of sales to chonsei prices in Korea, and Section 5 concludes with brief remarks 
about monetary policy. 
 
2.  Chonsei System in Korea 
 
The Korean housing market has a very unique system, called chonsei, whose 
literal meaning is ‘total rent.’  In this system, the tenant pays an up-front lump-sum amount 
of deposit (currently 30 to 70 percent of house sales prices) to the owner for the use of the 
property with no additional requirement for periodic rent payments.  The interest earned on 
this lump-sum deposit, therefore, provides income to the owner during the contract period 
(typically two years), and the deposit is returned to the tenant when the contract expires.  If 
the owner does not return the chonsei deposit at maturity, the Korean legal system grants 
the tenant to take a right of full control over the property until the owner returns the deposit.  
That is, the deposit money of tenant is legally protected as an asset that can be claimed 
against the collateral value of the property. 
Although its historical origin is obscure, the literature has attributed the popularity of 
chonsei system to the underdevelopment of formal financial services (mortgage services in 
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particular) and the government interventions for interest rates.2   During the period of 
‘government-led development,’ in particular, the Korean government kept interest rates low 
for business firms.  These interventions inevitably imposed higher-than-equilibrium 
interest rates on consumer credit and housing finance in the formal financial market.  
Under this environment, “For landlords, chonsei is an informal financial instrument that 
satisfies various household credit demands. …. For tenants, the chonsei system allows 
households to afford homes that would not be possible for outright cash purchase.” 
(Ambrose and Kim (2003), p.62) 
This chonsei system has been widely spread out with the rapid urbanization for the 
last few decades in Korea.3  According to the Population and Housing Census Report 
(2000), the total number of households in Korea is 14.31 million, out of which 7.75 million 
(54%) are homeowners and 4.04 million (28%) are under chonsei contracts (the remaining 
households are under monthly rents).  In particular, the ratio of chonsei tenants increases in 
metropolitan areas, where housing prices are high.  For example, the number of chonsei 
tenants is as large as the number of homeowners in Seoul (out of 3.09 million households, 
                                              
2
 See for example Renaud (1989) and Choi (2003). 
3
 See Ambrose and Kim (2003) for details. 
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1.26 million (40%) are homeowners and 1.27 million (40%) are under chonsei contracts.) 
Given the popularity of chonsei system, it is obvious that a substantial amount of 
assets are held in the form of chonsei deposit in Korea.  For example, a back-of-the-
envelop calculation yields 200 to 250 trillion won, approximately 40 percent of GDP or 80 
percent of the total stock value, as the outstanding amount of total chonsei deposit.4  Given 
this size of the chonsei deposit, it seems natural that policymakers are concerned about the 
fluctuation of chonsei prices. 5   More important than the chonsei prices themselves, 
however, may be the ratio of sales to chonsei prices.  This ratio is often interpreted as an 
indicator for the affordability of potential homebuyers because relatively young and/or poor 
households commonly live under chonsei contracts until they accumulate sufficient savings 
                                              
4
 According to the 1997 National Wealth Survey, the total value of household housing (excluding 
land) is 485 trillion won, which is approximately 50% of the total building value of all sectors.  
Applying this ratio of 50% to the total land value estimate, 1,548 trillion won, yields 1,259 
(=774+485) trillion won as the total value of housing (including land).  Using 28% as the ratio of 
chonsei dwellings and 60% as the ratio of chonsei to sales prices, one can obtain 212 trillion won in 
1997, which is estimated to inflate to 284 trillion won as of the end of 2003, applying the chonsei 
price index.  This amount is almost 40 percent of GDP (721 trillion won) or 80 percent of total 
equity value (355 trillion won) in 2003. 
5
 While many chonsei contracts are revolved upon maturity, the related parties write new contracts 
whose prices reflect market situations at that time.  Therefore, new contracts involve cash 
transactions between owners and chonsei tenants, whenever chonsei prices change in the market. 
With general price inflation, it is common for tenants to deposit additional money that covers the 
increments in chonsei prices, but there were some exceptional cases.  For example, housing prices 
including chonsei prices were collapsed by more than 20% nationwide in the swirl of economic 
crisis in 1998, which pushed many owners to the verge of liquidity crisis and invited the 
government to mobilize special rescue funds for them. 
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in addition to the chonsei deposit for the purchase of their own houses.6  As an extreme 
example, if 100% of chonsei deposit is held for future purchase of houses, then a 1% 
increase of sales price over chonsei price simply implies a 1% decline in the purchasing 
power of chonsei deposit. 
Apart from the policymakers’ concerns, the information about chonsei prices is 
potentially very useful in identifying the factors that affect asset prices of real estate. Unlike 
the sales price, the chonsei price inherently excludes the possibility of capital gains and 
reflects the value of housing service assessed by the spot housing market itself.  In this 
sense, the Korean housing market provides an important additional indicator for the real 
estate prices, which are not available in other countries.  Next section considers various 
factors that explain the discrepancy between the sales price and chonsei price, but the 
emphasis will be given to the expected capital gains that are greatly influenced by macro 
variables such as interest and inflation rates rather than other micro or institutional factors. 
 
3.  Theoretical Discussion 
3.1. Interest Rate, Inflation Rate, and Real Estate Prices 
 
                                              
6
 For the stylized facts of housing tenures and demography, see Renaud (1989) and Choi (2003). 
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Chonsei vs. Purchase 
 
A household in Korea having two choices for housing service, either purchase or 
chonsei, would consider the following factors.  First, there are inherent differences 
between homeowners and chonsei tenants.  For example, the homeowners are free to move 
whenever they want, while the chonsei tenants do not enjoy such a freedom.  This is a 
factor that boosts the sales price relative to chonsei price.  In contrast, however, the 
homeowners should bear the cost to maintain the quality of houses that chonsei tenants do 
not have to care about.  This is a factor that discounts the sales price relative to chonsei 
price.  A priori, therefore, it is not clear whether the sales price should be inherently higher 
than the chonsei price. 
Second, the homeowners should bear the risk of price fluctuations, while the 
chonsei tenants are relatively well protected from such risks.  As far as investors are risk 
averse, this is a factor that discounts the sales price relative to chonsei price.  Third, the 
homeowners should pay taxes that chonsei tenants are free from.7  This is another factor 
that discounts the sales price relative to chonsei price.  In short, these factors cannot 
explain why sales prices are substantially higher than chonsei prices for the basically same 
                                              
7
 Section 4 provides explanation on the Korea’s real estate tax system. 
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housing services. 
Therefore, the primary reason for the huge discrepancy of the sales price relative 
to chonsei price seems to lie in the expectation on capital gain.  That is, the chonsei tenants 
are expected to recoup only the deposit in monetary unit upon maturity, but the owners will 
be able to enjoy capital gains if the house prices rise as they did in Korea.  As any other 
prices in monetary economy, the rise of house price is composed of two parts, the rise in 
the relative price of house over general prices and the rise of general prices (or inflation) 
itself.  However, the rise of relative price can hardly be sustained in the long run, and thus 
this paper focuses on the general price inflation as the underlying factor that persistently 
increases house price.8  For the same reason, the general price inflation can be seen as a 
primary factor for the sales price that remains substantially higher than chonsei price all the 
time. 
 
 
 
An Arbitrage Condition 
                                              
8
 Theoretically, it is possible that the relative price of house keep rising at a more rapid rate than 
general prices if the productivity growth rate of housing sector is permanently lower than other 
sectors.  However, this does not seem to be the case at least in Korea during the 1987-2003 period: 
the overall housing price increased at 4.1% per annum, slightly lower than the CPI inflation rate of 
5.0%, although the average apartment price increased at 6.9%, slightly higher than the CPI inflation 
rate.   
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Focusing on the aforementioned factor of expected capital gain, the arbitrage 
condition between the sales and chonsei prices can be written as:  
 
(1)  )1(/)( 1 tHttCttHt iPEPiP +






+= +  , 
 
where HtP  is sales price at time t, 
C
tP  is chonsei price, ti  is nominal interest rate, 
)( 1Htt PE +  is the sales price at time t+1 expected at time t.  That is, the sales price at time t is 
the discounted sum of the return for housing services (or the opportunity cost of dwelling in 
the house rather than leasing the house on a chonsei contract), Ctt Pi , and the expected sales 
price at time t+1, )( 1Htt PE + . 
 This arbitrage condition can be recursively solved forward, and the solution will 
be a complicated function of the expectations about future chonsei prices and interest rates.  
Assuming a steady state with no speculative bubbles (in which the interest rate is fixed at i  
and the chonsei price increases at a constant inflation rate of pi ), however, Equation (1) 
produces a simple and intuitive result:  
 
(2) 
pi−
=
i
i
P
P
C
t
H
t
. 
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That is, the ratio of the sales to chonsei price is equal to the ratio of nominal to real interest 
rate.  Of course, this result is based on many restrictive assumptions.  Nevertheless, if the 
sustained real interest rate is around 4 percent and chonsei price inflation rate is around 3 
percent (a medium-term target inflation rate of the monetary authority in Korea), this ratio 
becomes 1.75, which is similar to the ratio of sales to chonsei price at the end of 2003.9 
 
Financial vs. Real Asset Prices 
 
It has long been recognized that the existence of inflation raises the value of real 
assets relative to financial assets that are not hedged against inflation risks.  In Korea, the 
discrepancy between the sales and chonsei prices for the same housing can be referred to as 
a typical example for this.  In fact, the above result can be applied to rather general asset 
prices.  In a steady state economy where the nominal interest rate is fixed at i , the price of 
a financial asset that yields a constant return R  in monetary unit at every point in time is 
determined by iRRdse is /
0
=
∞
−
, while the price of a real asset that provides service flow 
whose price increases at a constant inflation rate pi  can be expressed as 
)/(Re
0
pipi −=
∞
− iRdse sis .  Therefore, the existence of inflation pushes up the price of a 
                                              
9
 The ratio of sales to chonsei prices of apartments at the end of 2003 was 1.7 for the nation and 2.0 
for Seoul. (Kookmin Bank (2004)) 
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real asset relative to that of financial asset providing the same service, and their ratio 
becomes the same as the sales to chonsei prices, 
pi−
=
i
i
P
P
C
t
H
t
.
10
 
 From this result, it is easily confirmed that a rise in the inflation rate would raise 
the price of real asset relative to that of financial asset.  What has not been much discussed 
in the literature, however, is that the same effect can be generated by the decline of real 
interest rate.  Defining the real interest rate as pi−≡ ir , Equation (2) can be re-expressed 
as 
rP
P
C
t
H
t pi+=1 , implying that the relative price is determined by the ratio of inflation rate 
to real interest rate, rather than by the inflation rate alone.  Therefore, even when the 
monetary authority strictly maintains a pre-announced target level of inflation rate, the ratio 
of sales to chonsei price rises if the real interest rate is lowered.  
 In order to relate this discussion to monetary policy, however, it seems necessary 
to explicitly understand the general price level.  In other words, the meaning of “real estate 
price” or “chonsei price” rather than the relative price of those two needs to be clarified in 
the context of general price inflation.  At the same time, if the discussion is extended from 
                                              
10
 The sales to chonsei price ratio can also be considered in this context.  The prices of chonsei and 
sales are itCs
t isC ePdsReP −− +=  000  and 
itH
ts
t isH ePdsReP −− += 00 , respectively.  The 
main difference between the two prices is that, at time t, chonsei renters are left with the chonsei 
deposit at time 0, while the owners are left with the house price at time t ( tHHt ePP pi0= ).  
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the housing market to the macro-economy, the real interest rate and rent need to be taken as 
endogenous variables.  In this sense, this subsection’s discussion is viewed as a partial 
equilibrium approach in which inflation rate, real interest rate, and rent are exogenously 
determined.  In order to sense a general equilibrium flavor, the next subsection will 
examine a very simple growth model. 
 
3.2 A Simple Growth Model 
 
 Consider a representative household who earns (nominal) income tt Ai  from asset 
tA  and spends ttCP  and tt HR  for consumption tC  and housing service tH , respectively.  
If the instantaneous utility function is given by )ln( 1 αα −tt HC  and the time discount rate is 
ρ , then the household solves the following optimization problem:  
 
(3) tpttt deHCMax −−∞ )(ln. 10 αα  , ttttttt HRCPAiAts −−=..  , 
 
where tA  denotes the increase in the asset level.  If the (nominal) value of the asset is the 
sum of (nominal) values of capital and houses,  
 
                                                                                                                                          
Comparing the two prices, one can derive )/()1/()1(/ )(00 pipi −≈−−= −−− iieePP tiitCH . 
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(4)  tHttKtt HPKPA +≡ , 
 
it is easy to show that the growth rate of consumption as well as capital becomes 
proportional to the real interest rate, or Kt
K
tt PPi /− : 
 
(5)  ρ−−== K
t
K
t
t
t
t
t
t
P
Pi
H
H
C
C 
. 
 
Production and Capital Market Efficiencies 
 
 In this economy with no frictions where real and nominal variables can be 
completely separated, the relative prices of real assets to consumption goods are entirely 
determined by the supply side, or the technology that stipulates how many units of real 
assets are accumulated at the expense of one unit sacrifice of consumption.  In order to 
make this point clear, assume the following technology: 
 
(6) )( tttt CBKDHK −=+  . 
 
For simplicity, this equation takes a linear production function tBK  and treats capital and 
house as perfect substitutes at the supply side.  A peculiar feature in this equation is the 
coefficient 10 ≤< D  that measures the units of increase in future capital when present 
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consumption is reduced by one unit.  While 1=D  is the standard case in growth models, 
the case of 1<D  can be interpreted in line with a Tobin’s q model in the sense that 1<D  
implies a real adjustment cost in investment. 11   Another, perhaps more pertinent, 
interpretation of D  may be the degree of capital market efficiency.  In other words, if the 
capital market efficiency is low, or 1<D , then the capital accumulation process is marred 
although the production efficiency B  is maintained. 
 Once the model is set up as above, it is easy to derive the equilibrium relative 
prices by equating the resource constraint (Equation (6)) and the budget constraint 
(Equations (3) and (4)).  That is, using Equations (3) and (4),  
 
(7) =+++ tHttHttKttKt HPHPKPKP   tttttHttKtt HRCPHPKPi −−+ )(  
 
is derived, and by equating this equation to equation (6), one can obtain the following four 
equilibrium conditions: 
 
(8-1) DPPDPP tKtKtt // ==  
                                              
11
 Of course, while the adjustment cost vanishes when the economy approaches a steady state in 
Tobin's q models, Equation (6) assumes that the cost exists permanently for simplicity.  See Abel 
and Blanchard (1983) and Lim and Weil (2003) for growth models that explicitly incorporate formal 
Tobin’s q specifications. 
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(8-2) KtHtKtHt PPPP == 1/      
(8-3) DBPPi KtKtt =−  /  ; 
(8-4) =−− 0/)( KrHttHtt PPRPi   =− HttHtHtt PRPPi //  tt BPR =  . 
 
 These results are easily predictable from the assumptions.  That is, Results (8-1) 
and (8-2) state that the relative price of capital (or house) to consumption good is 
determined by D , while Result (8-3) indicates that the real interest rate is determined by 
B  multiplied by D , or the efficiency of the capital transformation process from present to 
the future.  Result (8-4) is an arbitrage condition that the benefit from the purchase of 
house, the sum of rent tR  and capital gain 
H
tP , should be equal to the opportunity cost, 
H
tt Pi .  
 
Inflation and Chonsei Price 
 
The introduction of money in this model economy does not affect any relative 
prices, hence any resource allocation processes.  Therefore, if the monetary authority 
inflates a certain target price, say, consumption price tP , at a rate of pi , the asset prices 
will increase at the same rate.  In contrast, however, the rate of inflation can affect the 
relative price of chonsei.  As far as an arbitrage condition holds between the chonsei and 
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rent markets, the opportunity cost of chonsei, Ctt Pi , should be equal to the rent:  
 
(9) )/(/ pi+== DBBPiRP tttCt . 
 
Price Responses to a Decline in Real Interest Rate 
 
 What would happen to this economy if the real interest rate permanently declines?  
First, the growth rate is unambiguously lowered (Equation (5)).  The relative prices of 
assets to consumption goods, however, depend on the sources of the decline in interest rate.  
If the real interest rate is lowered due to the decline in B , then the relative price of house 
(or capital) does not change (Equation (8-1)), and only the relative price of chonsei declines 
(Equation (9)).  If, in contrast, the real interest rate is lowered due to the decline in D , 
then both the house (or capital) and chonsei prices rise, but the price of house rises more 
than that of chonsei.  [Figure 2] describes this situation. 
 The intuition that the decline in B  does not change the relative price of house can 
be explained as follows.  The price of house is ultimately determined by 
pi
pi
−
==
−−
∞
 i
RRdseP
si
H
)(
0
, and thus the fall in the real interest rate itself is a factor to raise 
the house price by lowering the discount rate for the future (or the return rate of alternative 
investment).  In a general equilibrium set-up, however, the rent R  is also lowered by the 
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decline in B  because consumption goods supplied by the same amount of capital are 
decreased while the supply of houses remains at the same level.  In the particular model of 
this subsection, the instantaneous fall in R  exactly cancels off the effect from the decline 
in the real interest rate, leaving the house price unchanged.12  In contrast, if the real interest 
rate is lowered due to the decline in D , the supply of consumption goods and R  do not 
change, raising the house price. 
 
Price Index and the Target Rate of Inflation 
 
 In the above, it was shown that the house price does not change if the real interest 
rate declines due to a fall in B .  Yet it is worthwhile to note that the house price here was 
the relative price of house to consumption goods.  In other words, this “price” becomes the 
price in monetary unit, only when the monetary authority uses the price of consumption 
goods as a target.  In practice, however, it seems common to include rent as an important 
component of the target CPI.13  If, for example, the monetary authority gradually increases 
                                              
12
 In this case, the relative price of capital to consumption good does not change, but the shadow 
price of capital (as well as consumption good) jumps up.  That is, an unanticipated adverse shock 
to productivity decreases the level of consumption, and the ex post marginal utility of consumption 
good is higher than the marginal utility that was expected before the shock was realized. 
13
 In Korea, the weight of rent is approximately 15% in the headline CPI that does not include 
owner’s equivalent rent (www.nso.go.kr).  If the owner’s equivalent rent was included in the CPI, 
the weight of rent would be increased to approximately 31%, which is similar to that in the U.S. at 
31.5% (www.bls.gov).  
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the price index,  
 
(10)  αα −≡ 1ttt RPq  
 
(instead of tP ), then the price of housing (as well as tP ) in monetary unit will rise even 
when a fall in B  lowers the real interest rate (see [Figure 2] for the time paths of the 
housing prices in this case). 
 Although the chonsei price in monetary unit is also affected by the choice of target 
price as well as the source of the decline in real interest rate, the ratio of sales to chonsei 
prices depends only on the inflation rate as confirmed in the previous subsection.  
Therefore, if the monetary authority lowers the target inflation rate proportionately in 
response to the decline in the real interest rate, the discrepancy of the chonsei price from 
the sales price would not be expanded.  [Figure 2] also shows the time paths of housing 
prices when the monetary authority follows such a rule. 
 
Quantity Responses to a Decline in Real Interest Rate 
 
 Though not a central issue in this paper, the responses of the quantity variables 
with respect to a decline in the real interest rate can also be traced (see Appendix for 
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algebra).  One of the results worth noting is that a fall in the real interest rate lowers the 
ratio of consumption to housing at the steady state, but raises the ratio of consumption to 
capital.   
It is natural to decrease the steady state level of capital to housing ratio as the real 
interest rate (or the marginal rate of return for capital) declines due to a fall in B , because 
the shock that lowers the marginal rate of return for capital does not directly lowers the 
marginal utility from the housing service.14  Therefore, the household reduces the saving 
for capital accumulation (hence income), but not the saving for housing.  This optimization 
behavior leads to a decrease in the steady state level of consumption, but not as much as the 
decrease in the steady state level of capital.  Recalling that the measured income is a linear 
function of capital, this implies that the steady state saving rate in the aggregate falls when 
the real interest rate declines.  At the same time, however, the saving rate for housing 
investment rises with a fall in the real interest rate or growth rate, which seems to be 
consistent with the recent experiences of the global economy as mentioned in the 
Introduction. 
 
                                              
14
 When the real interest rate declines due to a fall in D , the results become complicated.  See the 
Appendix. 
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Remarks 
 
 In order to learn intuitions in a straightforward way, this subsection introduced a 
very simple growth model in which all of the prices are instantaneously adjusted from one 
steady state to another.  This model may be extended in various dimensions to generate 
rich dynamics of asset prices.  For example, a Cobb-Douglas production function can be 
used instead of the linear production function of this subsection (results are available upon 
request).  In this case, a fall in the efficiency growth rate gradually lowers the real interest 
rate, and thus the discrepancy between the sales and chonsei prices is also widened at a 
gradual pace.  Another variant would be to explicitly introduce the Tobin’s q model, which 
would produce short-run fluctuations of asset prices.  Perhaps the most interesting 
variation of the model, however, might be the one in which housing rents adjust to 
fluctuations of interest rates in a gradual manner (probably due to a slow adjustment of 
housing market relative to consumption goods market).  This feature that relaxes the tight 
link between the housing and other markets would be able to generate short-run deviations 
of rents from interest rates, hence the fluctuations of house prices. 
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4.  A Brief Look at the Data15 
Interest Rate, Inflation Rate, and the Ratio of Sales to Chonsei Prices 
 
Based on the theoretical discussion of the previous section, this section takes a 
brief look at the actual data of the sales and chonsei prices of apartments from Korea.16  
While it would also be of great interest to examine the house prices in relation to general 
prices and macroeconomic fluctuations, the model’s predictions regarding these issues are 
not sufficiently clear.  At the same time, it is very likely that various sector-specific shocks 
have generated uneven effects across the housing market and other markets in actual data.  
This section, therefore, limits the scope of analysis to the relative housing prices that are 
presumably immune to the noises generated by micro sector-specific shocks.  In addition, 
considering that most theoretical discussion was based on steady state analyses, the 
empirical examination is also focused on the relationships of long-run trends across 
variables. 
                                              
15
 See Appendix II for variable explanations and data sources.  
16
 The data for house prices were collected from the Kookmin Bank. This data set is an official (or 
at least semi-official) one that the Korean government uses.  Originally, this data set was compiled 
by the National Bank for Housing, which was merged into the Kookmin Bank (then another 
government bank) and privatized after the Korean crisis.  This data set traces the prices of 16,000 
sampled houses throughout the whole country every month.  For apartments, the sample size is 
13,020 covering Seoul, 6 metropolitan areas, 56 cities, 4 Goons (district unit in rural area), and 90 
Gus (district unit in urban area).  Currently, the quality of the houses is not considered in this data 
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[Figure 3] shows the trends of relevant variables since 1986, the first year of the 
available data, along with their HP filtered trends.  First, the ratio of sales to chonsei prices 
([Figure 3A]) had declined from almost 3 in the late 1980s to around 1.5 in 2000, and 
rebounded back to 2 since then.  Second, apart from the exceptional hike during the 
currency crisis period in 1998, the nominal interest rate ([Figure 3B]) had also declined 
from over 15% in the early 1990s to around 6% in 2003.  Third, however, the expected 
inflation rate ([Figure 3C]) had also been lowered from over 5% in the late 1980s to below 
3% in 1998 and 1999, operating as a factor to lower the ratio of sales to chonsei prices.  
Fourth, in contrast, the portion of expected inflation in the nominal interest ([Figure 3D]) 
has been rising from below 20% in 1998 and 1999 to over 40% in 2003, mainly due to the 
decline in the real interest rate in spite of stable inflation expectations, which seems to 
operate as an important factor for the rebound of the housing price ratio. 
 
Taxes on Real Estate 
 
Although the inflation and interest rates seem to be capable of explaining the 
direction of long-term trend of the housing price ratio, they are not sufficient enough to 
                                                                                                                                          
set. 
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explain the magnitude of the changes in this ratio, particularly the ratio around 3 in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  During this period, the portion of the expected inflation rate in the 
nominal interest rate was nearly 50%, implying that the inflation and interest rates cannot 
generate the housing price ratio over 2.  This observation invites discussions on the other 
factors explained in Section 3 that can potentially affect this ratio.  In order to incorporate 
the other factors, slightly modify the arbitrage condition, Equation (1): 
 
(1’)  )1(/)()( 1 tHttHtCttHt iPEPPiP +

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
+−+= +τα  , 
where τ  is a tax rate for holding a house and α  represents all the other factors such as 
convenience for owning a house, maintenance cost, risk averseness, and so forth.  The 
reason for separating out the tax rate from other factors is that the changes in tax rate can be 
traced to an extent, while the changes of other factors over time are neither traceable nor 
believed to be significant.  Under the steady state assumption again, Equation (2) is 
modified to be: 
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The real estate tax system is extremely complicated in Korea: one should pay 
 26 
 
acquisition and registration taxes when he purchases a house, property tax while he holds a 
house, and capital gains tax when he sells a house.  However, what makes the system 
complicated is how to calculate the actual taxes.  For example, the legal tax rates for 
acquisition and registration are 2% and 3%, respectively, but the effective tax rates are far 
lower than the legal rates because the actual taxes are based on “publicly assessed values” 
that are far lower than market prices.  Similarly, the property tax rate ranges from 0.2% to 
7% progressively with property values, but the effective tax rate is estimated to be around 
0.1%.  The capital gains tax rate is 40-60%, but there exist many exceptional cases for 
reductions and exemptions. 
[Figure 3E] and [Figure 3F] show the estimated effective tax rates on real estate, 
or the total tax revenues divided by the estimates of total real estate value.  In light of 
Equations (1’) and (2’), these statistics have two potential shortcomings.  First, since the 
relevant tax data for apartments are not available, these figures report the effective tax rates 
for the entire real estate (including land and non-apartment houses).  Second, since the 
portion of property tax (or holding tax) in total real estate tax revenue is very low in Korea 
relative to those in other countries, the figures report not only the property tax rate but also 
the total tax rate including taxes related to transactions.  However, it should be noted that 
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the transaction-related taxes must have theoretically different effects on real estate prices 
from those of holding taxes. 
In spite of the shortcomings, the figures provide some basic insights.  First, the 
effective tax rate on real estate has been rising from a very low level ([Figure 3E]).17  In 
conjunction with the rapid decline of nominal interest rate, the relative size of the effective 
tax rate to the nominal interest rate has been sharply increasing ([Figure 3F]), implying that 
the tax factor appears to have contributed to the decline in the ratio of sales to chonsei 
prices.  Second, however, the magnitude of the impact by tax seems to be small relative to 
the impacts by interest rates and inflation rates: during the sample period in [Figure 3], the 
effective holding tax rate fluctuates from 0.02% to 0.12% only (from 0.1% to 0.6% for the 
entire tax rate), while the fluctuations of interest rates and inflation rates are in the order of 
several percentage points.  This observation seems to emphasize the importance of macro-
variables in determining the real estate prices, although the macro-variables as well as taxes 
do not appear to sufficiently explain the high sales price relative to chonsei price in the late 
1980s.18 
                                              
17
 The effective holding tax rate was merely 0.02% and even the entire tax revenue was less than 
0.1% of total real estate value in the late 1980s. 
18
 A strong conjecture among Koreans is that there were significant bubbles in real estate prices in 
the late 1980s, which has not been considered in this paper. 
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6.  Conclusion with Some Remarks on Monetary Policy 
 This paper discusses the relationship between interest rates and inflation rates on 
one part and the house prices (typical real asset prices) relative to chonsei prices (typical 
nominal asset prices) on the other.  The key point of the paper is that the relative price of 
sales to chonsei depends on the ratio of inflation to real interest rates.  Therefore, even 
when the monetary authority maintains a pre-announced target level of inflation rate, the 
relative price of sales to chonsei rises if the real interest rate declines.  
 It is not clear whether the monetary authority should be concerned about the 
changes in this ratio.  At least, the growth model presented in this paper is completely 
silent on this issue: there exists neither short-run fluctuation nor social cost from inflation.  
Probably the answer should be sought in the context of the debate about whether the 
monetary authority should be concerned with the fluctuations of asset prices in the first 
place.19  In addition to its implication on short-run economic fluctuations, however, the 
                                              
19
 The recent volatility in asset prices under the stable and low inflation environment has triggered 
a challenge on the standard inflation-targeting framework.  While a majority of economists (e.g. 
Bernanke and Gertler (2001), and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002)) still support the standard monetary 
policy framework represented by Taylor rules, a group of economists (e.g. Cecchetti et. al. (2000), 
Borio and Lowe (2002), and Hahm and Hong (2003)) argue that the monetary authority needs to 
react to asset price bubbles in order to stabilize the economy.  See Bean (2003) for this debate.  
Although from a quite different perspective, this paper’s result could be interpreted to provide a 
rationale for the monetary policy that considers asset price fluctuations. 
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changes in the relative housing price between sales and chonsei generate significant 
implications about wealth distribution in Korea.  As mentioned in Section 2, most of 
chonsei deposit is the savings that relatively young and/or poor people have reserved for the 
purchase of houses in the future.  Unless the capital market is perfect, therefore, a rise in 
the sales price relative to chonsei price is very likely to worsen the wealth distribution. 
 If the fluctuations in interest rates and the induced fluctuations in the relative 
house prices are cyclical, the implication about wealth distribution is temporary.  If the real 
interest rate (and growth rate) secularly declines, however, it may permanently deteriorate 
the wealth distribution.  In fact, the secular decline in capital productivity and real interest 
rates is a likely scenario in developing economies like Korea, although it may not be 
common in developed economies.20  [Figure 4], copied from Cho and Koh (1999), clearly 
shows the long-term declining trends of capital productivity and real interest rates in Korea 
for the past 30 years.  In this case, the monetary authority can at least in theory prevent 
such an “undesirable” deterioration of wealth distribution by lowering the target inflation 
                                              
20
 The convergence theory based on either the Neoclassical growth model (Barro (1991), Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil (1992)) or technology diffusion (Lucas (2000), Parente and Prescott (1994)) 
predicts a secular decline of (capital) productivity growth rate and real interest rate. 
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rate in proportion to the decline in real interest rate.21 
 In practice, of course, it is extremely difficult to identify the components of short-
term fluctuation, as opposed to secular components, from the variations of real interest rates.  
Given the widespread apprehension about the zero (nominal) interest rate bound, in 
addition, a more serious question may be how much to lower the target inflation rate in an 
economy with very low interest rates.  That is, as the real interest rate declines toward zero, 
the monetary authority may have to accept either a higher discrepancy between real and 
financial asset values or a higher risk of hitting the zero interest rate bound.  Regarding 
many issues, including this thought-provoking one, the paper does not provide rigorous 
discussions yet, and many arguments remain at conjecture levels.  No doubt that far more 
research is needed before drawing conclusions in this area. 
 
                                              
21
 A similar discussion can be found in Friedman (1969) where he argues that the optimal rate of 
inflation is minus real interest rate. 
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Appendix I: Dynamics of the Model in the Text 
 
The dynamics of the model in the text can be traced by solving the following three 
equations for tC , tH  and tK : 
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from the optimization of instantaneous allocation between consumption and housing 
expenditure.  While tC  and tH  always move along the steady state paths (although the 
steady state level of tC  can jump at the moment when a shock arrives), tK  has a 
transitional dynamics governed by: 
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In a steady state, therefore, these three equations yield: 
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Using these results, it can be shown that a fall in either B  or D decreases the steady state 
values of HC / , HK / , and CK / .  Finally, the aggregate saving rate at the steady state, 
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declines with a fall in B  and increases with a fall in D, but the housing investment ratio 
to output, 
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increases with a fall in B  (its direction with a fall in D becomes ambiguous). 
 
 36 
 
Appendix II: Variables and Data Sources 
 
Variables Notes Data Sources 
House Prices 
Since the ratio of the sales to chonsei prices is 
not available prior to December 1998, this 
variable was extended backward using their 
inflation rates of the sales and chonsei prices. 
Monthly House Prices, 
Kookmin Bank 
Nominal Interest Rate Yield rate on 3-year corporate bonds 
Monthly Bulletin,  
Bank of Korea 
Expected Inflation Rate 
Obtained by annualizing forecast values for 
the next three years (12 quarters) of inflation 
at every quarter using the structural vector 
auto-regression estimation composed of two 
variables, GDP and core CPI.  
Kim (1996),  
Cho (2003) 
On  
Holding 
1. Land: aggregate land tax, local education 
tax, and city planning tax 
2. Building: property tax, local education tax, 
city planning tax, and common facilities tax 
On 
Purchase 
Acquisition tax and registration tax 
Annual Local Tax 
Statistics Report, 
Ministry of Government 
Administration and Home 
Affairs 
Real Estate 
Taxes 
On  
Capital 
Gains 
Capital gains tax, excessively holding land tax
(existed during the 19911993 period only), 
and asset revaluation tax 
Statistical Yearbook of 
National Tax,  
National Tax Service 
Total Value 
of Real Estate 
This variable was extended backward using 
their inflation rates of house and land prices,
based on the total value of real estate 
estimated at the end of 1997 (2,500 trillion 
won: 1,548 trillion won for land and 952 
trillion won for buildings). 
National Wealth Survey, 
National Statistics Office 
Effective Tax Rates  
on Real Estate 
Ratio of the real estate tax revenues to the 
total value of real estate 
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[Figure 1A] Trends of House Prices 
 
 
[Figure 1B] Trends of Chonsei Prices  
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[Figure 2] Time Paths of House Price ( HtP ) and Chonsei Price ( CtP ) 
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[Figure 3A] Ratio of Sales to Chonsei Prices 
 
[Figure 3B] Nominal vs. Real Interest Rates 
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[Figure 3C] Expected Inflation Rate 
 
 
[Figure 3D] Expected Inflation Rate as a Portion of Nominal Interest Rate 
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[Figure 3E] Effective Tax Rate on Real Estate 
 
 
[Figure 3F] Effective Tax Rate relative to Nominal Interest Rate 
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[Figure 4] Trends of Real Interest Rates of Korea 
 
Source: Cho and Koh(1999). 
 
 
